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Introduction: Caring for patients in traditionally designed, large teaching hospitals is often frustrating.
Attempts at decreasing internal costs and inpatient length of stay are universally undertaken in order to
address dwindling reimbursement, and patient care becomes more specialized and fractionated. These
attempts have proven to be myopic, at best, and injurious to patient care and professional job satis-
faction, at worst. This manuscript attempts to characterize the operational processes of our university
operating room facility as well as make suggestions for operational improvements that can be applied to
all hospitals.
Methods: Through a step-by-step approach, we analyze the patient’s journey from the surgeon’s ofﬁce
through the day of surgery to discharge. Using this approach, a series of studies designed to identify
operational shortcomings and inefﬁciencies are undertaken, and the results of these shortcomings are
elucidated.
Results: In our operating room, the peri-operative services are composed of multiple departments, each
accountable to their own administrative silo. We found this to result in fragmented goals and objectives
confounded by individualized and conﬂicting incentives. Consequently, we conclude with a recommen-
dation that veers from process modiﬁcation to a disruptive innovation of the hierarchical organization.
Conclusion: Nowhere in the hospital is this drive for cost containment and increased patient volume
more evident than in the operating theatre. Long-term improvements must embrace radical reduction of
OR costs and increased operative patient through-put, (i.e. per 8 h day; per ﬁscal year) by re-engineering
the processes of operative patient care. In the end, the ultimate goal of safe and high-quality patient care
must not be compromised.
 2010 Surgical Associates Ltd. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
For those of us that work in large teaching hospitals of tradi-
tional design, providing efﬁcient, high-quality patient care can be
frustrating. New DRG and capitated/bundled reimbursement
systems are exerting enormous ﬁnancial pressures on us, and our
hospitals. The initial response to succeed in this economic climate
has been to offset the demands of decreasing reimbursement by
curbing internal costs and decreasing inpatient length of stay; thus,
pushing more patients through the hospital on a shoestring budget
to maintain our operating margin. We hire physician extenders and
nurse assistants; case managers and discharge planners; bed
coordinators and insurance coders e more and more professionals
to care for a smaller, speciﬁc piece of each patient’s hospitalization.
This approach has proven to be myopic, at best, and injurious to
patient care and professional job satisfaction, at worst.1e4ciates Ltd. Published by Elsevier LtNowhere in the hospital is this drive for cost containment and
increased patient volume more evident than in the operating
theatre. Here, costs are measured in minutes and revenue gained
on a per case basis. Long-term improvements must embrace radical
reduction of OR costs and increased operative patient through-put,
(i.e. per 8 h day; per ﬁscal year) by re-engineering the processes of
operative patient care.5 During the re-engineering processes,
teaching hospitals must also preserve the mission of resident
education. In the end, the ultimate goal of safe and high-quality
patient care must not be compromised.
This manuscript attempts to characterize the operational
processes of our university operating room facility. This is a large
hospital system servicing the tertiary care needs of the New York
Upstate. The process for a patient begins in the surgeon’s ofﬁce and
continues through the day of surgery to discharge. We hope to offer
speciﬁc plans to 1. Maximize revenue production by increasing
patient through-put without increasing costs. 2. Maintain bench
mark levels of patient safety. 3. Increase patient and employee
satisfaction. We recognize that these objectives are inter-relatedd. All rights reserved.
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line might not always be good for the patient! The lessons learned
from our speciﬁc process study are applicable to every large tertiary
care hospital.
In our operating room, the peri-operative services are composed
of multiple departments, each accountable to their own adminis-
trative silo: Surgery, Anesthesiology, Nursing, Materials Processing/
sterilization, Transport/Housekeeping, clerical support, Informa-
tion technology. This traditional teaching hospital structure leads to
fragmented goals and objectives confounded by individualized and
conﬂicting incentives. What’s good for the surgeon might not be
good for the nurse; what’s good for the nurse might cost the
materials processing division extra.6,7 Consequently, we conclude
with a recommendation that veers from process modiﬁcation to
a disruptive innovation of the hierarchical organization.
From our focused examination, we offer broad institutional
suggestions that are applicable in any hospital setting, in any
country, and across any hospital service. Operational consider-
ations are inherently linked to the pattern of accountability. We
have taken an in depth look at our hospital’s work ﬂow and are
conﬁdent our ﬁndings and suggestions can spur process improve-
ments in operating rooms everywhere. This will lead to an under-
standing of why the big, traditional hospital doesn’t work.2. Methods
2.1. “Does the operative day start on time?” (Study 1)
To answer this simple question in our OR, a cohort of 115 “ﬁrst
start” patients was examined. “First start” patients were those
scheduled to start the day as the “ﬁrst” patient in a given operating
room. This group was chosen to eliminate the downstream effects
that develop as the operative day progresses and delays/variabil-
ities accumulate.6 Variations of start time from scheduled start time
were recorded. In theory, the patients scheduled for a “ﬁrst start”
should represent the best-case scenario for the operating room
ﬂow process.2.2. “What does this delay cost us?” (Study 2)
A dollar value for operating room “down time” was assigned.
This standard value was derived from the URMC e Ofﬁce of the
Director and reﬂects an activity-based (ABC) accounting of oper-
ating room costs.2.3. “How many additional cases can be performed during lost
time?”(Study 3)
300 consecutive cases performed in the Division of Pediatric
Surgery were chosen and operating incision time to the time
dressings were applied was used to calculate total time of the
surgical case. From this data, we are able to extrapolate the number
of cases that can be performed during “down time”.2.4. “Do we end the operating day on time?” (Study 4)
We examined the end of a typical operating room day by
examining a full operating day. A “full day” of prime OR schedule is
to end at 5 pm. All support staff is scheduled as such and the
hospital budgets for a dedicated amount of overtime pay. We
enlisted hospital ﬁnancial records to determine the actual amount
of overtime pay spent relative to the budgeted amount ($500,000).2.5. “Are pre-operative documents completed on time?” (Study 5)
To grossly assess the end product of patient processing pre-
operatively, 35 random charts were selected to represent the end
products of pre-operative document management. These charts
were examined to determine the presence of all necessary pre-
operative documentation.
2.6. Analysis of area 1 (Study 6)
The entire surgical experience from decision to operate through
surgery is evaluated in a step-by-step fashion. Three operational
AREAS were evaluated in this process; Area 1 involves pre-opera-
tive planning, scheduling, insurance approval, and testing. Histor-
ical data was acquired in all areas that were studied utilizing
existing hospital tracking technology.
2.7. Analysis of area 2 (Study 7)
Area 2 involves the mechanics on the day of surgery which
process the patient from hospital arrival to the operating room.
Data (times) were collected over a three-month period and were
further reﬁned to patients  18 years of age to focus analysis on
pediatric providers.
2.8. Analysis of area 3 (Study 8)
Area three involves the actions and events in the operating room
itself. The operative time consisted of the interval when a patient
enters the operating room, undergoes his/her procedure, and exits
the room to recovery. Start time is currently deﬁned in the data
collection system as the time when the patient enters the room.
Within the operating time, there are three speciﬁc steps that are
performed by unique individuals. Step one of area 3 is the time
from patient entering the room until he/she is ready for the surgical
team to begin. Step 1 is attributable to the anesthesiologist and
includes activities such as IV placement, patient transfer to the
table, and anesthetic induction. Step 2 of area 3 is the time attrib-
utable to the surgical team and includes activities such as patient
positioning, prep, and the surgical procedure itself. Step 2 is
completed when the “dressing” is applied to the patient. Step 3 is
again attributable to the anesthesia team and involves reversal of
anesthesia, emergence and transfer of the patient out of the room.
Data for intra-operative processes are collected electronically:
the time the patient physically enters the OR, time to anesthesia
induction, time devoted to surgical preparation/patient posi-
tioning, operative duration from incision to closure, and time of
anesthesia reversal.
2.9. Assessment of ASA status (Study 9)
We investigated the variability of the above 100 patient’s ASA
scores and their correlation with times dedicated to induction and
reversal. Statistical analyses for all studies were carried out using
SAS version 9.1 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, N.C.).
2.10. What account for delays and is the process stable? (Study 10)
In order to link time intervals to varying surgeon, anesthesiol-
ogist, nursing team, and ASA classiﬁcation, a regression analysis
was performed where complete data (times) were available. The
primary analysis looked at the association of each independent
variable on the time interval while controlling for the other vari-
ables (listed above) not being assessed. This was done in a univar-
iate fashion. No adjustments for multiple comparisons were made.
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stable e if variation is minimal and expected e through X-bar and
X-mR analysis.2.11. Reliability of documented times (Study 11)
Direct observation was performed by independent nurses of
randomly selected operating rooms and procedures to record reli-
ability of; documented ASA class, patient arrival time, time of
induction, induction complete, positioning time, incision time, skin
closure/dressing, and patient out of room. An additional data sheet
allowed the observer to record the common causes of delay.3. Results
3.1. Study 1
Of the 115 “ﬁrst start” cases, only 19 (16%) entered the operating
roomwithin 5 min of their scheduled 7:30 AM start. It is important
to note that this “time in the room” does not equate with surgical
start of the case. The actual operation itself does not begin until
a later time. 28 cases entered the room between 6 and 15min of the
7:30 AM start time representing 24% of the total. 64 cases (56%)
entered the room between 16 and 20 min, and the remaining
cases entered the roommore than 20min late. Breaking these cases
down into delay categories in proportion to the 115 sample cases,
24% would be expected to be delayed approximately 10 min, 56%
delayed 18 min and 3% delayed for some time longer than 20 min.3.2. Study 2
The URMC Ofﬁce of Director quotes a cost of $3600 per hour of
unused operative time per operating room. This value excludes
physician time lost and was estimated in the fall of 2007. Given this
estimate, these delays represent a cost of $90,720 on a ﬁrst case
basis alone over a two-week observation period.
On a light day, our operating suite runs 30 rooms. Assuming 5
days a week for 50 weeks of the year (conservative estimates), this
represents 7500 “ﬁrst start” cases annually. Total delay time for
“ﬁrst start” cases would approximate 98,100 min annually and cost
nearly $5.9 million. Separate data from the administrator of peri-
operative services in the fall of 2007 increased this time/value
estimate to $100/minute or $6000/hour. Using these ﬁgures, the
lost opportunity cost nearly doubles to $9.6 million for only ﬁrst
case delays.3.3. Study 3
Using pediatric surgical divisional data, we ﬁnd that the average
pediatric operation requires 60 min and, even if we double that
time to account for non-surgical activities, there are over 800
operations that could be additionally performed annually in those
minutes lost at the start of the day. From our surgical chief’s report,
the average contribution margin per surgical case (including
inpatient and out patient cases) approaches $6000e that translates
into potential proﬁt of $4.8 million.3.4. Study 4
For ﬁscal year 06e07 the operating room exceeded the overtime
budget by $960,000. Total overtime pay for the nursing staff alone
approached $1.4 million e a near 200% variance from budget.3.5. Study 5
From the random sampling of pre-operative charts, we found
that no charts were complete. Each chart was missing formal
documentation that would require updating or completion on the
day of surgery.3.6. Study 6
A process map of area 1 (Exhibit 1) was created to diagram the
ﬂow of patients and their accompanying chart materials from the
“decision for surgery” in the surgeon’s ofﬁce to “patient arrival” on
the day of scheduled surgery.
The process starts immediately after a surgeonmakes a decision
to proceed with surgery and a patient consents. Two forms are
generated in our hospital: the Assessment/History & Physical form
(H&P), and the Consent for Medical or Surgical Procedure form
(Consent Form). These forms are then provided to the surgeon’s
secretary. The secretary is the main resource of the document
management process. The surgeon’s secretary initiates the formal
request for surgery with an electronic Form 973 (includes patient
information, patient insurance, scheduling details, patient medical
physician information, ICU, anesthesia requirements, pre-operative
testing, special needs, and discharge needs, if any). The secretary
also enters a CPT code (billing code provided by the physician), an
ICD-9 code (diagnosis code), and LOS information (Length of Stay).
The electronic form is then submitted to multiple departments:
document management, scheduling, utilization review, ﬁnancial
counseling, and referral intake.3.7. Study 7
Approximately 1300 patients were identiﬁed in our study age
group. Data was surprisingly sporadic and incomplete with errors
such as surgical start time entered before patient ready time. Less
than 50% of these charts were suitable for examination. From this
set, 100 clean cases were selected.
Patients check-in and register on the day of surgery and then
wait, on average, 19 min before physically moving into the surgical
center. The standard deviation of this wait time, however, is 28 min
e exceeding the average time. Once in the surgical center, the
patient changes clothes and waits over 1 h (67 min Average; SD
53min). The next step is transport to the Pre-anesthesia unit where
a typical wait averages 48 min (SD 28 min).3.8. Study 8
As with the electronically recorded time data, standard devia-
tions were high. The time credited to anesthesia induction was
13 min (SD 9). Surgical preparation and positioning was the same,
averaging 13min (SD 9). Average operative time is variable and was
not isolated by CPT or ICD-9 for this analysis (Average 66 min; SD
67 min). Anesthesia reversal then consumes an additional 11 min
and has a standard deviation of 15 min.3.9. Study 9
Of the clean charts available, 84% of all patients were low risk
with ASA classiﬁcations of 1 or 2. On average, the ASA status of the
patient is not a predictor of thewide variation in the data presented
above (Exhibit 4). In fact, the lower ASA patients required more
time for anesthesia induction.
Exhibit 1. Pre-operative Planning: The activities performed during each step and the people/machines/materials utilized are included. The ﬂow diagram documents the process of
care for patients including the site of service, resources per service and those “value-added” (blue) steps as perceived from the patient’s perspective. The activities performed during
each step were identiﬁed and enumerated through interviews conducted with the individuals involved in each of the steps (surgeons, anesthesiologists, ofﬁce managers, secretaries,
and nurses).
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On average, turnover times consume 26 min with a standard
deviation of 11 min. Time for anesthesia induction was found to be
independent of anesthesiologist (Exhibit 5) but dependent on
surgeon (r ¼ 0.65, p < 0.0001). Time of inductionwas found to vary
inversely with ASA classiﬁcation. Given the limited data sets
available, X-bar and X-mR analysis reveal an unstable system
(Exhibits 6 and 7). Upper and lower control limits were set threeExhibit 2. Day of Surgery: The patient’s operative day is oustandard deviations away from the mean or calculated from the
observed moving range. Exhibits 6 and 7 demonstrate frequent
process deviation above the limits.
3.11. Study 11
Generally, the times recorded in the electronic system matched
our experimental results with respect to anesthesia induction and
patient positioning e steps 1 and 2. However, the electronicallytlined here from arrival to discharge from the hospital.
ASA Classification 
Class 1 Healthy patient, no medical problems 
Class 2 Mild systemic disease 
Class 3 Severe systemic disease, but not incapacitating 
Class 4 Severe systemic disease that is a constant threat to life 
Class 5 Moribund, not expected to live 24 hours irrespective of operation 
An e is added to the status number to designate an emergency operation. 
An organ donor is usually designated as Class 6 
Exhibit 3. ASA Classiﬁcation.
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patient emergence from anesthesia to patient leaving the room
(Step 3). Our experiment documented a total non-operative in
room time on average 51 min versus 34 min documented in ESI.
4. Discussion
We ﬁrst asked a simple question “Does the operative day start
on time?” (Study 1) Akin to any production schedule, ﬁrst start
activities have a downstream impact. Initial delays are ampliﬁed
and culminate in overtime shifts, patient and employee dissatis-
faction, and negatively impact ﬁnancial measures e an ideal
operating room should not waste resources.6,8 When we asked
what these delays cost, the results were signiﬁcant (Study 2).
Because lost minutes are only good if they can translate into
additional cases or operations (Study 3), we feel that our estimation
of additional cases has utility.9e12 We recognize, again, that
capturing delay time in 5 min intervals is difﬁcult to translate into
additional case contribution margin, but it must be acknowledged
that recapturing even a percentage of this cumulative time delay
would lead to additional case revenue.11 This additional revenue,
again, is not small.
It is possible that our assumption regarding “start time” was not
relevant (Study 1) in that the operating room day was able toExhibit 4. The variability of ASA status is correlated here with duration to surgical preabsorb the lax start times and still produce an adequate product.6,12
We therefore examined the end of the typical OR day (Study 4). A
“full day” of prime OR schedule is to end at 5 pm. Nursing shifts and
support technicians are scheduled accordingly. Variability in room
turnover, patient induction, and surgery times results in a high
demand for nursing “overtime pay differential”.6 Some of this is
unavoidable as an emergency trauma case or transplant occurs;
consequently nearly $500,000 a year is budgeted by our hospital for
nursing overtime demand. Actual overtime pay far exceeded this
budgeted amount.
Surgical delay is a signiﬁcant issue and improvement in this area
could confer a large ﬁnancial beneﬁt. We submit that a goal of
improved adherence to a schedule is one way to achieve improved
patient through-put with the corollary beneﬁts of decreasing
overtime costs and increasing employee/patient satisfaction. In
addition, a stable schedule, like a stable production line, is then in
a position for process analysis and optimization.7 The problem is
clear: in large teaching hospitals we don’t start on time and we
don’t ﬁnish on time. These delays in the morning cost us revenue
opportunities and lead to delays at the end of the day. It isn’t too
much of a stretch to see how this impacts staff and patient
satisfaction.
It is important to explore the role of incentives in this system.8 In
this electronic system, the web database is accessible by all those
involved in the process, resulting in a system of relative checks and
balances. It tries to foster a pattern of accountability for completion
of the documentation process quickly and accurately. However,
there is no single individual in charge of this process and, therefore,
no evaluation metric for this pre-operative phase e no reward, or
punishment for incomplete/inaccurate patient records. There are
no incentives. An economist would argue that people behave
according to their incentives, or people behave to maximize the
good and minimize the bad. This mechanism is completely lacking
in the big university scheduling system.
In Study 6 we see that the electronic system has placed
the surgeon’s secretary in a central role for the pre-hospital phaseparation. The “sicker” patients are induced faster than the more healthy patients.
Exhibit 5. Individual Anesthesia providers are shown here with their individual times from entrance of room to surgical preparation. Regression analysis revealed that time to
induction was independent of Anesthesia provider and dependent on surgeon.
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tation management process. These individuals have decentralized
speciﬁc knowledge about individual procedure requirements,
surgeon availability and preferences, and patient variables (age,
geography, insurance, and co-morbidities). When we discuss eval-
uations and incentives, we ﬁnd that secretaries are employed by
the hospital. Their pay scale is rigidly deﬁned. They are evaluated by
the rules established by HR across the entire University. The
surgical secretary is paid and evaluated in the same fashion as the
secretary working in the pathology department (or, the English
Literature division). The effective implementation of incentive
systems may require a restructuring of the current administrative
silos. It may be that the secretarial pool is reassigned under the
managerial governance of the operating roomwhere their decision
rights have a direct and measurable impact.-10
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Exhibit 6. X-bar and X-mR analysis of control charts reveWhen the charts of “Same Day” admit patients delivered to the
surgical center the day prior to surgery (Study 5) were assessed as
the end product of this Area, it was found that no charts were
complete. According to the ﬂow diagram, these charts should be
complete and ready for processing the morning of surgery. Each
chart was missing formal documentation that would require
updating or completion on the day of surgery. No feedback loop
exists to inform those that generate or pass on incomplete or
ﬂawed data. This also results in a potential compromise of the
quality of care, as patients were not uniformly treated with Veno-
thromboembolic (VTE), Antibiotic, and peri-operative Myocardial
Infarction prophylaxis. To maintain safety, surgical delay is incurred
as these measures are manually corrected on the day of surgery.
Performance data from our institution based on procedures
scheduled per-week found that 62% of ICU beds needed on the dayX-Chart
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Exhibit 7. Upper and lower control limits are set 3 standard deviations from the mean or calculated from the observed moving range.
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were booked with the incorrect level of care (Outpatient, 23-h stay,
same day admit). Fully 83% of patients arriving for surgery had
incomplete chart documentation. Thirty-one percent had no chart
documentation whatsoever on the day of surgery. These data are
supported by previous reports that suggest operational errors may
impact patient ﬂow time on the day of surgery and compromise
quality of care.7,8
Whenpatients arrive for surgery (Exhibits 2 and 3), their process
though the operating suite is closely followed (Study 7). In recent
years, a computerized system includes the electronic processing of
patient documents in the pre-operative period. Data collection
begins in this computer program when the patient arrives at the
operative suite on the day of surgery. The system tracks the patient
through the operating room and to the PACU for recovery and
discharge via bar code scans. The cases that were selected in Study 7
represented cases where all time data were available from check-in
through discharge. Again, it is important to note that there is no
feedback loop to correct data entry or any incentive for providers or
transporters to accurately enter this data. Consequently, the holes in
the electronic ﬂow chart are not surprising.
In total, Area 2 consumes 134min inwaiting and processing and
has virtually no “value-added” merit. We expect that this has
a negative impact on patient satisfaction.7e9 One cannot separate
waiting time from actual raw activity/service time. The wide vari-
ation in the time is also signiﬁcant. Because this is clearly not
a stable it cannot be optimized. Furthermore, the 134 min
consumed in non-operative activity is offset by patients asked to
arrive 90 min before their scheduled operative time e again,
a potential negative impact on patient satisfaction.
As conﬁgured, the electronic system is effective in documenting
patient location and time in the hospital, but it does not offer any
extractablemechanism to identify causes for delays. In addition, the
current pattern of accountability in peri-operative services does not
evaluatewhat data there is for system improvements. Because of the
separate managerial silos existing in peri-operative services, any
delay leads to a ﬁnger pointing mentality rather than uniﬁed
problem solving. One must proceed nearly to the director’s ofﬁce
before the independent silos intersect with a common leadership.
The agency costs associatedwith this system clearly are a detriment
to efﬁcient operations, quality patient care, and revenue generation.Individual “utility maximizing behavior” is rampant and does not
equate with “hospital or patient maximizing behavior.” This system
processes patients; it is not patient centered. This is another argu-
ment in favor of hierarchical restructuring.
It is important to understand that each operation is scheduled
based on the surgeon’s estimate of his/her raw activity time to
perform the posted procedure. The operating room schedule only
takes this predicted time into consideration e exclusive of times/
activities incurred by the anesthesia team. Under this system,
delays are inevitable. Each operative room must have a turnover
time to prepare and set up for the next case. This period involves
cleaning the room, opening new and case-speciﬁc instruments, and
setting up a new anesthesia circuit. It is a process that requires the
teamwork of nursing staff, anesthesia staff, and the materials/pro-
cessing group e all who belong to different managerial silos with
different incentive structures. As such, there is no documentation of
the reasons for delay occurring at this step. There is no data tracked
for the time expended, or by whom, on these activities. Similarly,
there is no extractable data that documents reasons for delay in this
turnover process. Conceivably, by tracking the personnel involved
in the turnover process, (i.e.: surgeon, USA staff, RN, Tech, Anes-
thesia) the times required for each activity, and reasons for delay,
we could standardize the process and decrease the turnover times.
In addition, we would recommend metrics to institute a reward
structure for those who perform above benchmarks. Decreasing
turnover times by 10 min each over a standard operative day could
lead to one additional operative procedure performed in that room/
day. If we apply the ﬁnancial measures above, that leads to $30,000
additional contribution margin for the hospital weekly, or $1.5
million over a year. Or, even if that case doesn’t happen, the ability
to end on timewill signiﬁcantly decrease the overtime burden! The
non-ﬁnancial costs of overtime and an unpredictable schedule such
as demoralization of the staff, dissatisﬁed patients, and future lost
clients are difﬁcult to quantify but should be acknowledged.10
Anesthesiologists were found to share similar times of induction
regardless of patient speciﬁc variables or nursing team (Study 10).
However, they performed signiﬁcantly faster for different operative
surgeons, suggesting a bias for providers to performmore efﬁciently
when working with surgeons who offer incentives for good perfor-
mance, however tangible or intangible these incentives may be.
Incentives for good performance range from interpersonal praise to
Chief Operating Officer
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SystemsNurse in Chief
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Scheduling personnel
Tree Diagram 1. Proposed restructured hierarchy with elimination of traditional
department structures (silos) in the surgical suite.
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to say anesthesiologists took more time e for non-productive
activities e on healthy patients and moved more rapidly when the
patients were more complicated. It is not surprising that emergent
patients, where intubation and access was accomplished in the
emergency roomor ICU, took less induction time.While it is possible
that speciﬁcpatients requiredmoredetailedanesthesiapreparations
with their patient population, this was outside of the scope of this
examination andnot likely to have impacted our results signiﬁcantly
due to the fact that only the pediatric surgical service was studied.
Taken together, operative delays are a very signiﬁcant source of
operating room cost. A “full” operative day for a surgeon is to end at
5:00. However, because of these hidden times, the full day
frequently runs into the evening shift. Differential pay for nursing is
substantially greater than the standard rate and occurs daily.
Smoothing the scheduling in this fashion leads to more predictable
allocation of resources. Scheduling must account for the additional
times that are not predicted by the posting surgeon e these should
include an estimate of the anesthesia and nursing related activity
times. At the very least, a goal of improved adherence to a schedule
may be one way to achieve improved patient through-put with the
corollary beneﬁts of decreasing overtime costs and increasing
employee/patient satisfaction. In addition, a stable schedule, like
a stable production line, is then in a position for process analysis.
As we discussed with room turnover times, surgery involves the
coordinated action of many different team members e surgeons,
nurses, materials/processing, anesthesiologists. Each of these
individuals are said to be on the “operative team,” but they report
to very different hospital divisions. These divisions have various
incentive structures and expectations. We may be a teamwhen we
are facing a patient, but we are frequently in competitionwithin the
hospital for time, resource allocation, or even parking spaces.5. Conclusions: why large, traditional hospitals don’t work
The analysis of our operating room identiﬁed many duplicated
processes. It also identiﬁed many areas where improvementscould be directly linked to increased revenue, patient safety
benchmarks, and potentially, staff satisfaction. This study identi-
ﬁed the following:
1. Pre-operative charts are incomplete.
2. Operating room scheduling is inaccurate.
a. Operating room doesn’t start on time.
b. Operating room doesn’t end on time.
3. Anesthesia activity times are not incorporated in scheduling.
4. Patients experience long queue times.
5. Patient through-put on the operative day is an unstable system.
6. Data collection is inadequate and inaccurate.
7. There is no feedback mechanism or pattern of accountability to
correct errors.
8. There are no incentives or consequences for improved
patient care, through-put, cost containment, chart readiness,
or adherence to schedule. In fact, the fragmented “silo”
structure of the operating room leadership leads to con-
ﬂicting incentives.
There are many suggestions that we could make to identify
process changes aimed at ﬁxing the areas that our study found to be
ﬂawed. For example, we suggest that the operating room could
stagger the room start times so that attending anesthesiologists
need not be in two rooms at once and the ﬁrst case delay is mini-
mized; or that all surgeons use a standard procedure to submit
operative consent forms.
However, the current leadership structure in most large
teaching hospitals is one of traditional “silo” organizations
comprised of nursing services, anesthesia, materials processing,
administrative support, and surgery. It focuses on the components
of patient care and not on the patient. Consequently, each faction is
prone to maximizing individual utility and excellence rather than
patient centered, team care. Our ﬁndings illustrate these inade-
quacies. Ultimately we want to improve the experience and
outcomes for our patients who require surgical care and simulta-
neously enhance the work environment in a cost effective fashion.
The operating room needs to become a single service area where
multiple professionals provide coordinated care, identify strategic
priorities, and share the risks/rewards.
Based on our ﬁndings, we propose that elimination of the
traditional department structures in the surgical suite will lead
to a restructuring that is more patient focused and outcome
driven. We are currently pursuing this restructuring at our
institution. (Tree Diagram 1). The ﬁrst step is to establish
a managerial team with primary leadership recruited from
outside the hospital. This chief operating ofﬁcer cannot be
perceived as “belonging to” one of the traditional silos or
departments of nursing, anesthesia, or surgery. His/her direct
reports will include representation from these groups and also
an information technology ofﬁcer. This last member is essential
as operations become “on line” but also because evaluation of
outcomes/data will guide strategy decisions. We cannot over
state the importance of this objective position. As we discussed
above, the electronic system in the operating room only marks
the location of the patient during the day of surgery, but not any
extractable data about providers or reason of delay and the
document managing systems that follow the patient’s chart,
insurance, and paperwork similarly can’t provide information
about how the chart is prepared or who is doing a good job.
This leadership structure needs to become patient focused and
not department focused. Evaluation metrics will be jointly agreed
upon by the leadership team and gathered by the Information
Systems division. By eliminating the traditional silos, evaluation
metrics can be uniformly applied to all OR personnel. For example,
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the privilege of a ﬁrst start. This will be applied and enforced from
the operating room COO even if the surgeon is the “chief” of
a surgical division. Similarly, Anesthesia personnel that do not
perform up to their peers (locally or nationally) could be reassigned
or penalized ﬁnancially e even if the anesthesiologist is “chief” of
a division. This objective evaluation of the IT data and adjustment
of behavior works best when everyone functions under a single
patient centered team. Currently, each team member reports to
a different silo, so when a dispute emerges between a cleaning
worker and a nurse; a doctor and a nurse, there is no central
authority to mitigate the conﬂict. Similarly, each team member
currently has different reward metrics administered by their
respective silo chairperson and individual utility maximizing
behavior does not lead to hospital/operating room/patient utility
maximization. This can change by restructuring the pattern of
accountability.
Process analysis and performance evaluation is an on going
activity e not an end point. We must balance the beneﬁts of
incentives/performance metrics with the cost of acquiring and
evaluating that data. We recognize that incentives cannot be too
small or too infrequent that people loose interest in performing
well; however, acquiring and analyzing performance data on
a daily basis is expensive and time consuming, and fails to
consider outliers. There is a role of incentives in motivating
performance.
Your large tertiary hospital doesn’t work because every
employee is focused on his/her individual division and not on
the patient. The prevalent accountability metric favors perfor-
mance within each department e within each silo e not in
a patient centered culture. A patient centered service center
restructuring would be beneﬁcial to all hospitals. This is the only
way to align everyone’s incentives and ultimately break down
departmental silos and conﬂicting interests. This investigation
will be repeated once this restructuring has taken place at our
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